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Abstract - In the current age of trade and financial openness, remote and poor local economies are becoming 
increasingly exposed to inflows of external capital. External investors - enjoying lower credit constraints 
than local dwellers - might play a propulsive role for local development. At the same time, inflows of 
external capital can produce environmental externalities which negatively affect labor productivity in local 
natural resource-dependent activities. In our paper, we consider a small open economy with three factors of 
production - labor, a renewable natural resource and physical capital- and two sectors - the “industrial sector” 
and the “local sector”. Physical capital is specific to the industrial sector whereas the natural resource is 
specific to the local sector. External investors participate in the industrial sector as long as the return on 
capital invested is higher than in other economies. The activity of the industrial sector generates a negative 
impact on the environmental resource. In this context, we assess under which conditions the coexistence of 
the two sectors gives rise to an increase in the welfare of the local population. 
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1 Introduction
Processes of global integration of economies, urbanization and industrialization and the growing
demand for raw materials and commodities have increased the exposure of rural economies to
external inuences and investments. External investments may take the form of foreign direct
investments (FDI) or domestic capital ows deriving from urban or richer areas. In both cases,
the inow of capital is usually regarded as benecial for local economic growth and poverty
reduction.
This article discusses the impact of external investment inows on local development with
a focus on the role of environmental externalities and of capital market segmentation. These
are two recurrent features of many developing countries where local borrowing and investment
capacity is often more limited than in other regions or countries, while external investors enjoy
better access to capital markets. Moreover, unlike new incoming activities, local production
is usually profoundly dependent on environmental dynamics. For local populations, natural
systems represent means of subsistence or valuable economic services and assets.1 In these
contexts, implementation of new productive projects nanced by external capitals might provide
local communities with new income and labor opportunities and help them to escape from a
poverty trap of low capital stock-low income generating possibilities. However, local activities
may also be negatively aected to the extent that they are vulnerable to environmental costs.
Neoclassical and endogenous economic growth theories have largely neglected environmental
dynamics associated with external capital inows, focussing instead on their role in stimulating
economic development. Capital inows and external investors' projects can relax credit con-
straints (Brems, 1970), generate spill-over eects on local rms, create employment, develop
new infrastructures, expand tax base, and generate scal revenues (Findlay, 1978; Lall, 1978;
Wang and Blomstrom, 1992; de Mello Jr., 1997; Markusen and Venables, 1999; Barrios et al.,
2003; Janeba, 2004; Amiti and Wakelin, 2003; Li and Liu, 2005). This may result in economic
acceleration which, in turn, can sustain a process of poverty reduction. Despite these theo-
retical arguments, empirical literature has not still completely conrmed the positive eects
of external capital inows. For example, if we focus on the nexus between output growth and
economic development and FDI, which represents the typical example of external actors' invest-
ment, we can observe that a meta-analysis by Wooster and Diebel (2010) nds that \evidence
of intrasectorial spillovers from FDI in developing countries is weak, at best" and the literature
review provided by Reiter and Steensma (2010) shows that empirical ndings on the role of FDI
in economic development are still mixed. At the same time, several studies have discussed at
length suitable conditions required to produce such benecial results for host economies, from
institutional and legal contexts, corruption and social capability, to the degree of the competi-
tion or complementarity with local activities, the technological gap, the level of human capital
and development of host economies, the development of nancial markets and receptiveness to
trade, as well as investment regulation, labor intensity in investment sectors and FDI sectorial
composition (Blomstrom et al., 1994; Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; Borensztein et al., 1998;
Lim, 2001; UNCTAD, 2001; Alfaro et al., 2004; Aykut and Sayek, 2007; Chakraborty and Nun-
nenkamp, 2008; Kemeny, 2010; Reiter and Steensma, 2010; Alguacil et al., 2011). All these
conditions may explain the considerable degree of heterogeneity in the empirical research on
the eects of FDI. The same variety of results emerges in the recent empirical literature about
the environmental impact of FDI (Waldkirch and Gopinath, 2008; Hubler and Keller, 2010;
1For example, it has been estimated that in some large developing countries ecosystem services and other
non-marketed goods account for between 47 percent and 89 percent of the total source of livelihood of rural and
forest-dwelling poor households (UNEP, 2010).
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Chang, 2012; Lan et al., 2012; Perkins and Neumayer, 2012).
Despite this ambiguity in the econometric ndings, anecdotal evidence already runs into
decades of case studies of struggles by local communities against large investors, either national
or foreign, which threaten their environment. This suggests that negative interactions between
natural resources dependent small communities and large investors may not be insignicant.
Case studies of protests by poor communities to gain control over natural resources and to
deal with environmental degradation created by big companies, for instance, have been docu-
mented, among others, by Lee and So (1999)2 and Martines-Alier (2002).3 Numerous documents
provided by journalists and activist organizations describe struggles against mining activities
responsible for depletion and contamination of water, air and soil pollution.4 Since the late
1980s, the impact on poverty and deforestation produced by the expansion of large mechanized
agriculture, livestock and timber activities has been analyzed by De Janvry and Garcia (1988),
Heath and Binswanger (1996) and Chomitz (2008). In other cases, local communities are neg-
atively aected by processes of industrialization activities. China provides some of the most
symbolic examples of rural communities harmed by the arrival of new manufacturing rms. Sig-
nicant damage to agriculture and shery sectors caused by Chinese industrialization have been
documented, amongst others, by Economy (2004) and World Bank (2007). Finally, empirical
evidence (Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Ghertner and Fripp, 2007) increasingly suggests that the
adoption of cleaner technologies and changes towards less environmentally intensive consump-
tion explain only a part of the reduction in the pollution intensity of production systems in
Northern countries. In contrast, the growth and composition of imports have also signicantly
contributed to the reduction of pollution levels in high-income countries. The ip-side of these
processes is the absorption of environmentally intensive industries by the developing countries.
All these factors suggest that the development process of emergent countries cannot be viewed
in isolation from environmental pressures exerted by external forces. This paper contributes
to the debate on the relationship between external investments, poverty reduction and sus-
tainability by discussing how this link is aected by environmental attributes of the recipient
economy, that is initial endowments of natural capital, environmental carrying capacity, pollu-
tion intensity of economic activities and capacity to coordinate decisions with environmental
implications.
In order to enable the analysis of those aspects that are most relevant to our objective,
this paper develops a unied model which includes environmental externalities and the job
eect of capital inows, but it excludes other positive indirect eects which have already been
widely discussed by the literature on FDI and the theory of Big Push that, starting from
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), calls for large-scale externally-nanced investments (Easterly, 2006).
In the proposed model, the potential eect of poverty-reduction of external capital ows oper-
ates through the labor market by creating new labor opportunities and raising labor demand.
Positive spill-overs in host economies are, instead, excluded and local and new activities are not
2Lee and So explore the proliferation of grassroots movements in South Asia against multinational corpora-
tions which extract raw materials or move their production plants in this region.
3Martines-Alier describes the actions of Oilwatch, a south-south network concerned about the pollution and
loss of biodiversity, lands and forests caused by oil and gas extraction in tropical countries. He also deals with
the growing social resistance against export oriented commercial shrimp farming in several Asian and Latin
American countries. In many cases, the expansion of legal or illegal shrimp ponds has caused the eviction of
small scale shermen and the destruction of coastal mangrove forests to the detriment of local communities.
4See, for instance, information and documents at the following websites: Earthworks,
http://www.earthworksaction.org/. Mines and Communities, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/.
No Dirty Gold, http://www.nodirtygold.org/. Observatory for Mining Conicts in Latin America,
http://www.conictosmineros.net/. Oxfam America, http://www.oxfamamerica.org/.
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connected by inward or forward linkages. It is worth emphasizing that in this model we use the
term \external" to refer not just to foreign investors, but also to national entrepreneurs whose
capital derives from a source outside the local economy. Therefore, our model can be considered
as complementary to the two-sector models with environmental externalities and intersectorial
labor mobility proposed by Lopez (2010), Antoci et al. (2009) and Antoci et al. (2012). These
two latest works dierentiate the sectors in terms of capital intensity, dependence and degree
of pressure on natural resources. In this model, we consider a similar setting, but we allow
for international capital mobility. Lopez's model, instead, considers a closed economy where
pollution causes two opposite eects: it reduces productivity in the natural resource-dependent
sector and it pushes up the price of the good produced in this sector. In other words, the price
channel mitigates the negative impact of environmental externalities on the harvesters' welfare.
In our model, this compensatory mechanism does not work because we consider a small open
country where prices are set outside the economy. Since most developing countries are small
open economies and take prices as given, we reckon that the analysis of these dynamics in
absence of the price eect is an important extension. Like in Lopez (2010), Antoci et al. (2009)
and Antoci et al. (2012), in the present model an expansion of physical capital can reduce the
stationary state value of natural capital, but its eect on local welfare operates in a dierent
way. In Lopez (2010), it always produces an improvement in welfare, regardless of the impact on
natural capital, since the eects of the environmental degradation are more than compensated
by the price of the good produced by the resource-dependent sector. In our model, as in the
model analyzed in Antoci et al. (2009) and Antoci et al. (2012), the accumulation of physical
capital instead can give rise to a reduction in local populations' welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in sections 2-3;
sections 4-5 investigate the basic properties of dynamics that emerge from the model and give
a characterization of the dierent dynamic regimes that can emerge; in section 6, the dynamics
with and without external investment inows are compared; section 7 analyses the context
in which negative externalities are internalized by a social planner. Section 8 oers some
concluding remarks.
2 The model setup
We consider a small open economy with three factors of production -labor, a renewable natural
resource and physical capital - and two sectors - the \industrial sector" and the \local sector".
Physical capital is specic to the industrial sector5 whereas the natural resource is specic
to the local sector. In this economy, agents belong to two dierent communities: \External
Investors" (I-agents) and \Local Agents" (L-agents). For simplicity, we assume that I-agents
cannot invest in the local sector, they invest in the industrial sector of the economy in question
or in other economies. We assume that they do not face credit constraints and their investment
capacity is \unlimited", that is, they invest in physical capital in this economy as long as the
return on capital generated is higher than in other economies. I-agents also hire the labor force
provided by L-agents. L-agents are endowed with their own working capacity only which they
use partly working as employees for external investors and partly in the local sector, where
they directly exploit the natural resource. To x ideas, we liken the local sector to the farming
sector, however such a sector may include shery, forestry or also tourism.
The production functions of the two sectors satisfy the Inada conditions, are concave, in-
5For simplicity we denote this sector as \industrial sector", but it may also include other types of actitivities
that are intensive in physical capital and produce environmental externalities, such as mining.
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creasing and homogenous of degree 1 in their inputs. In particular, the production function of
the representative L-agent is given by:
YL = E
L1 
where:
E is the stock of the free access environmental resource;
L is the amount of time the representative L-agent spends on local sector production;
0 <  < 1 holds.
The L-agent's total endowment of time is normalized to 1 and leisure is excluded, thus
1 L represents the L-agent's labor employed by the representative I-agent as wage work. The
production function of the representative I-agent is represented by the Cobb-Douglas function:
YI = K

I (1  L)1  (1)
where KI denotes the stock of physical capital invested by the representative I-agent in the
economy,  > 0 is a productivity parameter and 1 >  > 0.
Both communities are constituted by a continuum of identical individuals and the size of
each community is equal to 1. The dynamics of E are described by a logistic function modied
by taking account of the impact of the industrial sector. We assume that the environmental
impact of the local sector is nil since our focus is on those scenarios where environmental damage
of local agents' production is negligible compared to that of capital-intensive activities:

E = E(E   E)  Y I (2)

E = 0 for E = 0
where Y I is the average value of YI and  is a positive parameter measuring the environmental
impact caused by Y I . The positive parameter E represents the carrying capacity of the envi-
ronmental resource, that is, the value that E would approach in absence of the negative eect
generated by the industrial sector.
We assume that each economic agent considers to be negligible the eect of her choices on
the dynamics of E and does not internalize it. That is, Y I is considered to be exogenous and this
implies that each agent considers the evolution of E as exogenously determined when solving
her choice problem of labor allocation. As a result, economic agents behave without taking into
account the value of the natural resource and nobody has an incentive to preserve or restore
it. Consequently, the resulting dynamics are not optimal. However, the trajectories under such
dynamics are Nash equilibria, in that no agent has an incentive to modify her choices along
each trajectory generated by the model as long as others do not modify theirs. Working under
the assumption that each population of agents consists of a continuum of identical individuals,
the value of the average output Y I coincides (ex post) with the pro-capite value YI .
This is a stylized scenario, but it can represent the main dierences between the set of
options that local populations and external investors can use to generate their income ows and
to protect themselves from environmental degradation. The use of labor intensive techniques,
employment of family labor and constraints in access to credit markets are often key features
of the production activities of local communities. Barbier (2010), for example, summarizes his
review of empirical literature about the relationship between poverty and natural resources in
developing countries by observing that the rural poor are almost \assetless". They depend
\critically on the use of common-property and open access resources for their income ( Barbier
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(2010), p. 643) ", they rely on small plots of lands and on selling their labor which is their only
other asset. We model and simplify these settings by excluding, as in Lopez (2010), the fact
that the local agents can accumulate physical capital and by assuming that they can rely on
two productive inputs, namely their labor and natural capital.
External investors, in contrast, usually manage capital intensive activities based on employ-
ment and their companies or rms are able to gain access to capital markets. In addition, their
production is characterized by a high degree of mobility because it relies on wage labor which is
also available in other economies and on physical capital that can be employed elsewhere. They
can defend themselves against a reduction in capital returns in the local economy by moving
their capital towards other economies. On the other hand, local agents have fewer defensive
strategies and are vulnerable to environmental degradation. They can react to a reduction in
labor productivity in the local sector due to depletion of the natural resource by substituting
natural capital with wage labor, but this strategy has a limited eectiveness since it cannot
be adopted indenitely (the total amount of labor that can be employed by each local agent
is xed) and it can produce negative side eects through environmental degradation. As we
will illustrate below, this defensive strategy can generate a self-enforcing growth process of KI
associated to a reduction in the welfare of the local agents, according to which an increase
in environmental degradation generates an increase in the labor input in the industrial sector
which, in turn, produces further environmental degradation and so on. Analogous results are
obtained by Antoci and Bartolini (2004) and Antoci (2009) who show how defensive choices
against environmental degradation can be an engine of undesirable economic growth processes.
2.1 Maximization problems of agents and labor market equilibrium
The representative L-agent, in each instant of time t, has to choose the value of L in order to
maximize the value of the objective function:
L = E
L1  + (1  L)w
where w is the wage rate.
The representative I-agent chooses her labor demand 1 L and the stock of physical capital
KI , which she invests in the economy, in order to maximize the prot function:
I = K

I (1  L)1    w(1  L)  rKI
where r represents the cost of KI (which can be interpreted as an opportunity cost).
Both w and r are considered as exogenously determined. However, the wage w is endoge-
nously set in the economy by the labor market equilibrium condition (we exclude the import
of labor from other economies), while r > 0 is an exogenous parameter. We assume that the
inow ofKI is potentially unlimited and therefore the dynamics ofKI are not linked to I-agents'
savings but only to the productivity of KI (which, in turn, depends on L and KI).
An interior solution of the maximization problem of the representative L-agent must satisfy
the rst order condition:
w = (1  )EL  (3)
which determines the labor oer by the representative L-agent as a function of E and w.
The optimization problem of the representative I-agent gives rise to the following rst order
conditions:
@I
@(1  L) = (1  )K

I (1  L)    w = 0 (4)
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@I
@KI
= K 1I (1  L)1    r = 0 (5)
The labor market is perfectly competitive and wages are exible: the wage rate and the labor
allocation between the two sectors continue to change until the labor demand is equal to labor
supply. The labor market equilibrium condition is therefore given by:
(1  )KI (1  L)  = (1  )EL  (6)
By equation (5), it holds:
KI =


r
 1
1 
(1  L) (7)
and substituting KI in (6) we obtain:
L =  E (8)
where:
  :=
"
1  
(1  )  
r
 
1 
# 1

(9)
The function (8) identies the labor market equilibrium value L of L if the right side of (8) is
lower than 1; otherwise, the equilibrium value of L is 1, that is:
L = min f1,  Eg (10)
We will say that the economy is \specialized" in the production of the L-sector if L = 1.
Note that condition (3) excludes the specialization in the production of the industrial sector if
E > 0 (that is, L > 0 for E > 0 always holds). However, when E = 0, L-agents maximize
the function L by choosing L = 0 (complete specialization in the industrial sector). In the
context E > 0, two cases can be distinguished: the case without specialization (in the local
sector) and the case with specialization.
3 The time evolution of the stock E
If  E < 1, that is if E < 1= , L-agents spend a positive fraction of their time endowment
working in the industrial sector and the equation (8) identies the equilibrium value of L.
Moreover, in the case without specialization in the local sector, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium wage rate is constant and is given by w = (1  )  
r
 
1  .
Proof. By substituting (8) in (3) we obtain:
w = (1  )EL  =
= (1  )E [ E]  =
= (1  )    =
= (1  )


r
 
1 
Furthermore, in the context E < 1= , we have (by (7) and (8)):
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YI = K

I (1  L)1  =
= 
"

r
 1
1 
(1  L)
#
(1  L)1  =
= 


r
 
1 
(1  L) =
= 


r
 
1 
(1   E)
and consequently the equation (2) can be written as follows:

E = E(E   E)  


r
 
1 
(1   E) (11)
If E  1= , then L-agents spend all their time endowment working in the local sector, that is
L = 1, and the equation (2) becomes:

E = E(E   E) (12)
4 Classication of dynamic regimes
The time evolution of E is described by the equation (11) in the context E < 1=  and by the
equation (12) in the context E  1= . In this section, a complete classication of possible
dynamic regimes is given. Let us rst highlight the following basic properties of dynamics (2):
1) According to the non negativity constraint E  0, the state E = 0 is always a locally
attractive stationary state under dynamics (2) in that, if the stock E > 0 is low enough,
then

E < 0 holds according to equation (11).
2) The state E = E is a stationary state if and only if E  1= ; that is, if the carrying
capacity E is higher than the threshold value 1=  of E which separates the regimes with
and without specialization; furthermore, no stationary state with E > E can exist in
that, for E > E,

E < 0 always holds.
3) The interior stationary states (that is, those belonging to the interval (0; E)) coincide with
the values of E that annul the right hand side of the equation (11); in such stationary
states, the economy is not specialized (that is, 1 > L > 0).
4) According to equation (11),

E = 0 holds if f(E) = g(E), where:
f(E) := E(E   E) (13)
g(E) := a  a E (14)
a := 


r
 
1 
(15)
The graphs of f(E) and g(E) can have at most two intersection points and therefore at
most two interior stationary states can exist.
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Figure 1: Dynamic regimes in the context  < 0, obtained by varying the carrying capacity E
of the natural resource. The other parameters are xed at the values:  = 0:5,  = 0:5,  = 0:6,
 = 0:073, r = 0:25, ET = 0:3575, 1=  = 0:5184.
The following proposition gives the complete taxonomy of the dynamic regimes which can
be observed according to the dynamics (2). The proof of this proposition is straightforward
and, for space constraints, will be omitted. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate all the dynamic regimes
described in such proposition; full dots  and empty dots  represent, respectively, attractive
and repulsive stationary states.
Proposition 2 (1) In the context in which the condition  < 0 := 1= (a 
2) holds, the fol-
lowing dynamic regimes can be observed:
(1.a) if E  1
 
, then a unique interior stationary state EA 2 (0; 1= ) exists, which is
repulsive and separates the basins of attraction of the locally attractive stationary
states E = 0 and E = E (see gure 1(a));
(1.b) if
1
 
> E > ET := 2
p
a a , then two interior stationary states EA and EB exist,
with 0 < EA < EB < 1= ; the repulsive stationary state EA separates the basins of
attraction of the locally attractive stationary states E = 0 and EB (see gure 1(b));
6
(1.c) if E = ET , then two stationary state exist, E = 0 and E = ET :=
 
E + a 

=2 <
1= , and their basins of attraction are respectively the intervals [0; ET ) and [ET ;+1)
(see gure 1(c));
6In the context  < 0,
1
 
> ET > 0 always holds.
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Figure 2: Dynamic regimes in the context   0, obtained by varying the carrying capacity E
of the natural resource. The other parameters are xed at the values:  = 0:5,  = 0:5,  = 0:6,
 = 0:4232, r = 0:25, ET = 0:5162, 1=  = 0:5184.
(1.d) if E < ET , then the stationary state E = 0 is globally attractive (see gure 1(d)).
(2) In the context in which the condition   0 holds, the following dynamic regimes can be
observed:
(2.a) if E >
1
 
, then the dynamic regime coincides with that described in point (1.a) of
this proposition (see gure 2(a));
(2.b) if E =
1
 
, then two stationary states exist, E = 0 and E = E, and their basins of
attraction are respectively the intervals [0; E) and [E;+1) (see gure 2(b));
(2.c) if E <
1
 
, then the stationary state E = 0 is globally attractive (see gure 2(c)).
The coordinates of the interior stationary states EA and EB (when existing) are given by:
EA =
E + a 
2
  1
2
q
(E + a )2   4a
EB =
E + a 
2
+
1
2
q
(E + a )2   4a (16)
Notice that in sub-case (1.a) of the above proposition, if E =
1
 
, then EB = E holds. Further-
more, in sub-case (1.c), EA = EB = ET holds; in such a case, the straight line f(E) is tangent
to the graph of g(E) at the point (ET ; g(ET )) (see gure 1(c)).
Sub-cases (1.c) and (2.b) in Proposition 2 are \non-robust" in that they are associated
with equality conditions on parameters' values. The \robust" dynamic regimes described in
Proposition 2 can be classied as follows: (1) the dynamic regimes associated to sub-cases
(1.d) and (2.c), where the stationary state E = 0 is globally attractive; (2) the dynamic
regimes associated to sub-cases (1.a)-(1.b) and (2.c), characterized by the coexistence of two
locally attractive stationary states (bi-stable regime), the stationary state E = 0 and either the
stationary state E = E or the stationary state EB. Bi-stable regimes occur only if the carrying
capacity E of the natural resource is high enough; notice that the coexistence between the local
sector and the industrial sector can be observed only in the bi-stable regime corresponding
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Figure 3: The dynamics in the plane (E;KI) corresponding to the bi-stable regime illustrated
in gure 1(b).
to sub-case (1.b) (see gure 1(b)), where the environmental impact (measured by ) of the
industrial sector is low enough ( < 0) and the carrying capacity E of the environmental
resource belongs to the interval (ET ; 1= ).
Remember that the equilibrium value ofKI is determined by the equationKI =
 

r
 1
1  (1 
L) (see equation (7)), therefore KI is inversely proportional to L and, consequently, to E (see
equation(8)). Figure 3 shows the dynamics in the plane (E;KI) corresponding to the bi-stable
regime illustrated in gure 1(b). Notice that the stationary state with E = 0 is associated to
the highest value of KI .
5 Revenues of L-agents
Taking into account that the equilibrium wage rate is w = (1  )  
r
 
1  = a(1  ), we can
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3 L(E) = E
 holds for E  1
 
while L(E) =

     a(1  ) E + a(1  )
holds for E <
1
 
, where

     a(1  ) > 0. That is, L(E) is a strictly increasing function
of E for every E  0. Consequently, in bi-stable regimes illustrated in gures 1(a)-(b) and 2(a),
the attractive stationary states E = 0 is Pareto-dominated by the other attractive stationary
states (either EB or E = E).
Proof. The revenues L of the representative L-agent can be written as:
L = E
L1  + (1  L)w = EL1  + a(1  )(1  L)
where L = min f1,  Eg. Thus L = E holds for E  1
 
while:
L = E
 ( E)1  + a(1  )(1   E) =
=  1 E    Ea(1  ) + a(1  ) =
=

     a(1  ) E + a(1  )
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holds for E <
1
 
. Notice that the condition:
     a(1  ) = a(1  )
1     a(1  ) > 0
is always satised. This implies that L is a strictly increasing function of E for every E  0.
According to the above proposition, in our model, an increase in KI is always associated to a
reduction in E and L (see equation (7) and (8); this means that the environmental degradation
caused by the industrial sector produces a negative impact on labor remuneration which is
always larger than the positive impact of the rise in labor productivity due to an increase in
KI . Consequently, in a bi-stable regime context, the locally attractive stationary state E = 0 is
always Pareto-dominated by the other locally attractive stationary states (E = EB or E = E)
and is associated to the highest value of KI ; along the trajectory approaching it, the eort of
L-agents to defend themselves from environmental degradation drives the economy towards an
undesirable complete specialization in the industrial sector. However, this does not imply that
full specialization in the local sector always ensures the highest level of welfare for L-agents.
In fact, the type of sectorial composition which is preferable depends on a set of conditions
concerning the initial stock of natural capital, the pollution intensity of the industrial sector
and the carrying capacity of the environmental resource in the host economy. In the following
two sections we will clarify this observation.
6 Comparing the dynamics with and without external
investments
The eects generated by the external investments in our economy on L-agents welfare can be
better understood by discussing more in detail the implications of the considered model in terms
of environmental sustainability and by comparing the dynamics generated by the model (which
will be called Dynamics with Externalities (DwE )) and the dynamics according to which L = 1
and KI = 0 hold for every E  0 (which will be called Natural Dynamics (ND)), namely the
dynamics that would be observed in absence of external investors.
Let us rst specify the three main denitions of sustainability that we use (see Hanley et al.
(1997), pp. 425-444). A trajectory followed by the economy is sustainable if:
(1) along it the welfare of local agents does not decrease;
(2) along it the stock E of the environmental resource does not decrease;
(3) it converges to a stationary state characterized by a strictly positive level of the natural
resource (E > 0).
Taking into account the positive correlation between E and L, in our model the condition (1)
is satised if and only if the condition (2) is satised. Furthermore, if a trajectory is sustainable
according to the criteria (1)-(2), then it is sustainable according to the criterion (3).
In the ND-context, the environment is not aected by the polluting activity of the industrial
sector, the time evolution of E is described by the logistic equation (12) and the revenues of
L-agents are given by the function NDL (E) := E
. Under such dynamics, starting from every
initial value E(0) which satises the condition E  E(0) > 0, the economy follows a trajectory
along which NDL and E increase and approaches the stationary state E = E, where the
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revenues of L-agents are given by NDL (E) = E

. Such a trajectory is therefore sustainable
according to all the criteria (1)-(3).
In the DwE -context, we can observe that, according to Proposition 2, if the carrying capacity
E is suciently low (see the sub-cases (1.d) and (2.c) of Proposition 2), then the trajectory
followed by the economy is unsustainable according to all the criteria (1)-(3). In this case, the
economy converges always to the stationary state E = 0, whatever the initial condition E(0)
is, by following a trajectory along which the values of E and L are always decreasing (while
KI is increasing) (see gures 1(d) and 2(c)).
However, also in the DwE -context there exist trajectories along which E and L are in-
creasing (and KI is decreasing) and all the criteria (1)-(3) are satised. These trajectories exist
only if either   0 and E > 1
 
(see gure 2(a), corresponding to sub-case (2.a) of Proposition
2) or  < 0 and E > ET (see gures 1(a) and 1(b), corresponding to sub-cases (1.a) and
(1.b) of Proposition 2), that is, if the carrying capacity E is high enough with respect to . In
fact, under these conditions, a bi-stable dynamic regime occurs and:
i) The economy follows a sustainable trajectory, according to all the criteria (1)-(3), if either
E(0) 2 (EA; E], in the context of sub-cases (1.a) and (2.a) (see gures 1(a) and 2(a)), or
E(0) 2 (EA; EB], in the context of sub-case (1.b) (see gure 1(b)).
ii) The economy follows a trajectory along which E and L are decreasing, which is sustain-
able according to the criterion (3) only, if E(0) > EB in the context of sub-case (1.b) (see
gure 1(b)).
iii) The economy follows a trajectory which is not sustainable according to all the criteria
(1)-(3) if E(0) < EA.
Therefore, in a bi-stable regime context, sustainable trajectories according to all the criteria
(1)-(3) can be observed only if the carrying capacity E and the initial endowment E(0) of
the natural resource are high enough. It is worth stressing that the non transient coexistence
between the two sectors of the economy is observed along a sustainable trajectory only if the
stationary state EB exists (that is, only if the environmental impact of the industrial sector is
low enough,  < 0, and the carrying capacity satises the condition
1
 
> E > ET ) and if the
initial endowment of the natural resource is such that E(0) > EA.
These results show that the openness to external investments does not exclude environ-
mental sustainability and an improvement in the welfare of the local population even when
the incoming capital is invested in polluting activities and it ows towards economies that are
highly dependent on natural capital. The carrying capacity E, the initial stock of natural
capital E(0) and the rate of environmental impact of the industrial sector  play a key role
in determining the sustainability of the transition towards a diversied economic structure.
Interestingly, the importance of the environmental factors is not limited by the fact that the
economy is able to attract investments in activities that are not dependent on natural capital
and local agents are able to shift from one sector to the other one. Furthermore, it is possible to
demonstrate that a trajectory in the DwE -context may approach a stationary state, EB, which
Pareto-dominates the stationary state E = E in the ND-context, that is L(EB) > 
ND
L (E).
Again, the conditions on which such a result is based depend crucially on the parameters E and
. The following proposition highlights the conditions under which the value NDL (E) = E

is
higher than the value of L(E) evaluated at the attractive stationary states of DwE, E = 0 and
E = EB. The proof of such a proposition is straightforward and therefore it is omitted.
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Proposition 4 The condition E

> L(0) holds if and only if:
E > [a(1  )] 1 =
"
(1  )


r
 
1 
# 1

(17)
where
"
(1  )


r
 
1 
# 1

< 1= .
The condition E

> L(EB) holds if and only if:
EB <
E
   a(1  )
[     a(1  )]   (18)
where      a(1  ) > 0.
In the bi-stable regime of sub-cases (1.a) and (2.a) in Proposition 2, starting from E(0) >
EA, the economy converges to the same stationary state of the natural dynamics, E = E;
consequently, ND and DwE drive the economy (in the long run) towards the same welfare
level; however, starting from E(0) < EA, DwE approach the stationary state E = 0, where
L(0) < E

(being, in sub-cases (1.a) and (2.a), E  1= ). Thus, the long run eects on
welfare generated by external investments depend crucially on the initial endowment E(0) of
natural capital. However, in such a context (characterized by a high level of carrying capacity
E), the long run welfare in the DwE -context cannot be higher than the long run welfare in the
ND-context.
In the bi-stable regime of sub-case (1.b) in Proposition 2, instead, the comparison across
alternative stationary states in terms of local agents' revenues is more ambiguous as suggested
by Proposition 4. However, if the value of  is low enough, then E

< L(EB) holds and
therefore the stationary state EB in the DwE -context Pareto-dominates the stationary state
E = E in the ND-context; that is, a welfare improving coexistence between the two sectors can
be observed in a non transient way (that is, in a stationary state). In this case, the openness of
the economy to external investors is benecial for local agents' revenues. External investment
allows them to rely not only on activities that are limited by environmental constraints but
also on sources of income which can grow over time through physical capital accumulation by
I-agents. To check this result, remember that sub-case (1.b) is characterized by the conditions
1=  > E > ET := 2
p
a   a  and  < 0 := 1= (a 2), where the values of a and   do not
depend on  while ET ! 0 for  ! 0. Consequently, given E < 1= , such conditions are
always satised if  is low enough. Furthermore, being E < 1= , in E = E it holds L < 1 in
the DwE -context and consequently E

< L(E) (because, in the DwE -context, the revenues
are maximized with respect to L, given the value of E). This implies that, by the continuity
of the function L(E), E

< L(EB) holds if EB is near enough to E. In fact, this is just the
case when  is low enough in that EB ! E for  ! 0 (see equation (16)).
The value of the parameter  plays a key role in our model. If  increases, then EB
decreases, being @EB=@ < 0 (see (16)), and the condition (18) will be more easily satised.
Figure 4 compares the value of NDL (E) = E

with the values of L(E) in the locally attractive
stationary states E = 0 and EB (L(0) and L(EB), respectively). In such numerical exercise,
L(0) corresponds to the minimum level of local agents' welfare; moreover, L(EB) > E

holds
for low enough values of  while the opposite inequality holds for higher values of . When
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Figure 4: The value of revenues of local agents in the stationary state E = E (E

) of the
Natural Dynamics, compared with the revenues in the locally attractive stationary states E = 0
and E = EB (L(0) and L(EB), respectively) of the Dynamics with Externalities, obtained
by varying the value of the rate of pollution . The other parameters are xed at the values:
 = 0:485,  = 0:5,  = 1:2, r = 0:25, E = 3:5.
both the stationary states E = 0 and EB in the DwE -context are Pareto-dominated by the
stationary state E = E in the ND-context, then external investments always generate a long
run reduction in local agents' welfare. However, when EB Pareto-dominates E = E which,
in turn, Pareto-dominates E = 0, the long run eects of external investments depend on the
initial endowment E(0) of the natural resource: DwE will do better than ND if E(0) > EA,
vice versa if E(0) < EA.
Some other numerical exercises, varying the parameters  and r, may be useful to illustrate
the eects of a variation in these parameters on the values of EA, EB and L(EB). Figures
5(a)-(b) report the impact of an increase in  while gures 6(a)-(d) illustrate the impact of
a change in r for two dierent levels of . Observe that, when  increases, the values of EB
and L(EB) become lower, and this implies an increase in KI .
7 When  increases, the local
community faces a reduction in E and therefore in the productivity of self-employed labor and
local agents are pushed towards wage employment. In this context, the expansion of external
capital inows does not help local agents in that their welfare (evaluated at the stationary state
EB) declines. It is worth noting that these outcomes emerge even if the labor market is perfectly
competitive and is not segmented, that is, in a context where a rise in labor demand by the
industrial sector produces a pattern of labor reallocation that could raise labor remuneration in
both sectors. The introduction of environmental externalities, instead, mitigates the eects of
this channel of transmission resulting in an expansion of output share of the industrial sector
with constant wages and a decrease in local agents' welfare. Indeed, as reported in Proposition
1, the equilibrium wage rate is constant and is not aected by variations in the parameter
. A reduction in r, instead, has a positive impact on the wage rate. In fact, a decline in r
represents a decrease in external agents' opportunity cost of capital investment in the economy.
The consequent inows of external capital produce an increase in labor productivity in the
industrial sector and, as a result, also in labor remuneration. However, the net impact on L
also depends on the value of . For a suciently low  (gures 6(a)-(b)), a decrease in r leads
to a growth of L (evaluated at EB) though it causes also a decline in EB. As shown in gures
6(c)-(d), for a higher value of , however, the opposite is true and a reduction in r generates a
reduction in local agents' welfare and in EB.
7Notice also that the size of the basin of attraction of EB (the interval [EA;+1)) decreases when  increases.
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Figure 5: The values of EA, EB and L(EB) obtained by varying the value of the rate of
pollution . The parameter values are the same used in the numerical exercise illustrated in
gure 4.
7 Optimal economic dynamics
The inability of local agents to coordinate their choices might represent the main obstacle
to sustainable development in the economy under consideration here. This section discusses
the potential contribution of a social planner's intervention which ensures that environmental
externalities are taken into account in the choice of labor allocation between the local and
the industrial sector, made up of resource-dependent and resource-impacting activities. In this
section we analyze the dynamics of the economy under the assumption that the labor input L
of the representative local agent is chosen by a social planner which has the aim of maximizing
the value of the objective function:
+1Z
0
(L)  e tdt (19)
where the parameter  > 0 measures the time preference of the representative L-agent, which
can also be interpreted as a measure of altruism with respect to future generations. To express
the value of the revenues L = E
L1  + (1  L)w in terms of E and L only, we have to take
into account that the representative external investor chooses 1  L and KI in order to satisfy
the rst order conditions (4) and (5), given respectively by:
(1  )KI (1  L)  = w
K 1I (1  L)1  = r
Notice that, by the latter condition,
KI = (

r
)
1
1  (1  L) (20)
holds; by substituting (20) in the former condition, we obtain the value of the equilibrium wage
rate w which, substituted in L, allows us to write:
L(E;L) = E
L1  + (1  )


r
 
1 
(1  L)
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Figure 6: The values of EA, EB and L(EB) obtained by varying the cost r of KI , with  = 1:03
(gures 6(a)-6(b)) and  = 1:33 (gures 6(c)-6(d)). The other parameter values are the same
used in the numerical exercise illustrated in gure 4.
The social planner, therefore, has to choose the function L(t), t 2 [0;+1), that solves the
following optimization problem:
MAX
L
+1Z
0

EL1  + a(1  )(1  L) e tdt (21)
subject to the constraints:
_E = E(E   E)  a(1  L)
E  0, 0  L  1, where a := 


r
 
1 
. Notice that the maximization problem (21) satises
Mangasarian's sucient conditions; consequently, we have that if a growth path satises the
conditions of the Maximum Principle and the usual transversality condition lim
t!+1
E(t)  (t) 
e t = 0, where  is the co-state variable associated to E, then it is a solution of problem (21).
The current value Hamiltonian function associated to the problem (21) is:
H(E; ; L) = L(E;L) + 

E(E   E)  a(1  L)
By applying the Maximum Principle, we obtain the conditions:
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_E =
@H
@
= E(E   E)  a(1  L) (22)
_ =   @H
@E
= (   E + 2E)  

L
E
1 
(23)
where, in each instant of time, the value of L 2 [0; 1] is given by the solution of the problem:
MAX
L
H(E; ; L) (24)
Notice that if L = 1 solves problem (24), then the system (22)-(23) becomes:
_E = E(E   E)
_ = (   E + 2E)  

1
E
1 
Such system admits a unique stationary state with E = E and  =

( + E)E
1  . When
problem (24) admits an interior solution (that is, L 2 (0; 1)), then L must satisfy the rst order
condition:
@H
@L
= (1  )

E
L

  a(1  ) + a = 0 (25)
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By solving (25) with respect to :
 =
1
a
"
a(1  )  (1  )

E
L
#
(26)
and by substituting  in (23), we can write:
_ =
1
a
(   E + 2E)
"
a(1  )  (1  )

E
L
#
  

L
E
1 
(27)
Finally, deriving with respect to time both sides of the equation (25), we obtain:
_L
L
=
_E
E
+
   E + 2E
(1  )
"
(1  )a

L
E

  1 + 
#
  a
1  

L
E

(28)
which represents the time evolution of L when L 2 (0; 1) and, consequently, the trajectories
that the economy can follow are determined by the dynamic system (22), (28). These dynamics
will be called Dynamics with Social Planner (DSP).
It is easy to check that, according to (25), the optimal level of L is always higher (ceteris
paribus) than the value chosen by the representative L-agent in the Dynamics with Externalities
(see (6) and (7)). This is the case because the social planner takes into account of the \price"
 of the natural resource when she chooses L. In this way, the social planner is able to contain
an excessive use of wage labor which increases L-agents' revenues in the short run, but leads
to a reduction in L in the long run due to environmental degradation. Local agents can
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choose to allocate more time to the industrial sector in order to defend themselves against low
productivity levels in the local sector, due to low values of E; this defensive strategy, however,
generates a further reduction in E which, in turn, leads to an additional increase in the labor
input in the industrial sector and so on. This vicious process is self-enforcing and may drive
the economy towards the complete depletion of the natural resource, as we have shown in the
preceding sections. Unlike local agents, the social planner is able to internalize the negative
eects generated by such a self-enforcing process and to let the economy to follow a trajectory
along which external investments allow for the maximization of the value of the discounted ow
of revenues (19).
Due to space constraints, we shall not provide a complete analysis of the system (22), (28)
but we limit our study to some numerical simulations which have the objective of illustrating
some dierences between the DwE and DSP -contexts. In the simulation showed in gure 7,
three stationary states E1A , E
1
B and E
1
C exist. The states E
1
B and E
1
C are saddle points, and
their stable branches are indicated in bold, while E1A is repulsive. If the initial value E(0)
of the state variable E is such that 0 < E(0) < E1A (respectively, E(0) > E
1
A ), then the
initial value L(0) of the jumping variable L will be xed so that the trajectory starting from
(E(0); L(0)) belongs to the stable branch of E1C (respectively, of E
1
B ). Figure 8(a) illustrates
the trajectories of the DwE, obtained with the same parameter values used in the simulation of
gure 7, and gure 8(b) shows the projection on the E axis of the trajectories belonging to the
stable branches of E1C and E
1
B in gure 7. Notice that the attractive stationary states E = 0
and EB, in gure 8(a), have been \replaced" by, respectively, the saddle-point stable stationary
states E1C and E
1
B in gure 8(b), with 0 < E
1
C and EB < E
1
B . Thus, in this numerical example,
the complete environmental depletion is avoided in the DSP -context. The repulsive points EA
and E1A separate (along the E axis) the basins of attraction of E = 0 and EB and of E1C
and E1B , respectively. Figure 9 illustrates how the values of E
1
A , E
1
B and E
1
C change with the
varying value of the carrying capacity E. The continuous lines indicate the saddle-point stable
stationary states while the dotted line indicates the repulsive stationary state E1A . Notice that
if the carrying capacity E is low enough or high enough, then only one stationary state exists,
while for intermediate values of E the bi-stable regime illustrated in gure 7 is observed.
These results indicate that also in the DSP -context the initial endowment E(0) of natural
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Figure 10: The time evolution of L-agents' revenues L and of the stock E along trajectories
starting from the same initial value E(0). The graphs of the functions END(t), EDwE(t),
EDSP (t) represent, respectively, the time evolution of E in the ND, DwE, DSP-contexts, while
those of the functions NDL (t), 
DwE
L (t), 
DSP
L (t) illustrate the corresponding time evolution
of the revenues along such trajectories. The initial value E(0) is such that END(t), EDwE(t),
EDSP (t) approach, respectively, the stationary state values E, EB, E
1
B , with E > E
1
B > EB.
The parameter values are the same used in the simulation in gure 7 .
capital may play a key role in determining the optimal trajectory followed by the economy.
The role played by E(0) in the alternative ND, DwE and DSP -contexts is clearly shown in
gures 10 and 11, which illustrate the time evolution of L-agents' revenues and of E along
trajectories starting from the same initial value E(0). In these gures, the graphs of the
functions END(t), EDwE(t), EDSP (t) indicate, respectively, the time evolution of E in the
ND, DwE, DSP -contexts, while those of the functions NDL (t), 
DwE
L (t), 
DSP
L (t) illustrate the
corresponding time evolution of the revenues along such trajectories. In gure 10, the initial
value E(0) is such that END(t), EDwE(t), EDSP (t) approach, respectively, the stationary state
values E, EB, E
1
B , with E > E
1
B > EB. Notice that the value of 
DSP
L (t) becomes denitively
higher than the value of DwEL (t) and the value of 
DwE
L (t) is always higher that the value of
NDL (t). Consequently, in this example, Natural Dynamics do not give rise to the highest long
run welfare level. This result is reversed if the economy starts from a lower initial value E(0), as
it is shown in gure 11 where END(t), EDwE(t), EDSP (t) approach, respectively, the stationary
state values E, 0, E1C , with E > E
1
C > 0, and the value of 
ND
L (t) becomes denitively higher
than the values of DwEL (t) and 
DSP
L (t). This result is not surprising if we take into account
that the objective function (19) discounts future values of L at the discount rate  > 0.
Our simulations conrm that the initial endowment E(0) aects the ranking of the long
run welfare outcomes in the alternative contexts (ND, DwE and DSP) under consideration
here. If the initial value E(0) is high enough (that is, E(0) > EA and E(0) > E
1
A in the DwE
and DSP -contexts, respectively), both DwE and DSP meet the third criterion of sustainability
(that is, a strictly positive stationary value of E is reached), converge to a stationary state
in which both sectors coexist and are associated, in every instant of time, to higher levels of
L than in the ND- context (gure 10). Under these conditions, along the optimal trajectory,
a gradual reduction in natural capital is observed which implies an increase in investment in
physical capital and a progressive expansion of the industrial sector. In other words, in this
numerical example, the absence of external investment does not lead to the highest level of L
either at each instant of time or in terms of the discounted value of future revenues.
The opposite holds when E(0) < EA and E(0) < E
1
A , respectively, in the DwE and DSP -
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Figure 11: The time evolution of L-agents' revenues L and of the stock E along trajectories
starting from the same initial value E(0). The initial value E(0) is such that END(t), EDwE(t),
EDSP (t) approach, respectively, the stationary state values E, 0, E1C , with E > E
1
C > 0. The
parameter values are the same used in the simulation in gure 7 .
contexts (gure 11). Also in this case, the maximization of the objective function (19) implies
a convergence to a diversied economy without specialization. Moreover, the optimal solution
corrects the factors of unsustainability which aect the dynamics without social planning and,
in fact, it meets all criteria of sustainability (while dynamics with externalities is unsustainable
according to all adopted denitions). Nevertheless, in the context of gure 11, both DwE and
DSP generate long run welfare values which are lower than that generated by ND. In such a
case, the trajectory followed by ND is preferable to the trajectories followed by DwE and DSP
if the criterion of optimality is the maximization of L evaluated at the stationary state reached
by the trajectory instead of the maximization of the objective function (19).
8 Conclusions
We have analyzed an economy where local agents rely on free access to natural resources
and where they can defend themselves from environmental degradation by providing labor
to the industrial sector which is not dependent on natural capital. Moreover, the source of
capital for the industrial sector is \unlimited" in that external investors can raise funds in
nancial markets and invest in physical capital in this economy as long as the return on capital
generated is higher than in other economies. The labor market is perfectly competitive and
inter-sector labor movement is free and without cost. In such a context, we could expect that
an increase in capital investments in the industrial sector leads to a raise in welfare of local
agents. Our analysis, instead, shows that the introduction of the environmental impact of
the industrial sector mitigates, and in some cases reverses, this eect. In particular, in the
economy under consideration here, opposite scenarios are admissible: (a) the economy may
converge to the stationary state E = 0, following an undesirable self-enforcing growth process
of the industrial sector, associated with environmental unsustainability and impoverishment
of the local population; (b) it may undertake a sustainable transition towards a diversied
economic structure and converge to the stationary state E = EB > 0, where both sectors
coexist; (c) it may drive out capital inows and converge to the unique attractive stationary
state (E = E) of the \natural dynamics", namely the dynamics that would be observed in
absence of external investors. The type of path that is selected and which is preferable in
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terms of local agents' welfare and environmental sustainability depends on a set of conditions
concerning the initial stock E(0) of natural capital, the pollution rate  of the industrial sector
and the carrying capacity E of the environmental resource in the host economy. The paper
identies and discusses these conditions and shows how they aect the number and the stability
of the stationary states as well as their welfare properties. In particular, our analysis shows
that if the economy starts from a low enough value of E(0), whatever are the values of  and E,
then the scenario (a) will be observed. If the values of E(0) and E are high enough, whatever
is the value of , then the scenario (c) will occur. Finally, the scenario (b) will take place only
if  is low enough, E(0) is high enough and E is neither too low nor too high; this is the unique
scenario in which both sectors coexist in a non transient way.
In our economy, the environmental degradation (that is, the reduction in E) caused by
the industrial sector always produces a reduction in the welfare of local populations, which
is positively correlated with E. However, we nd that this result does not imply that full
specialization in the local sector always ensures the highest level of welfare for local agents.
Under strict conditions, spelt out in the paper, scenario (b) is preferable to scenario (c), that
is the arrival of external capital inows and the convergence to the stationary state with the
coexistence of both sectors leads to a higher welfare level among local agents than the absence
of external investments, even in a context in which environmental negative externalities are not
internalized by a social planner. The coordination of labor allocation choices by a social planner
can avoid the complete exhaustion of natural capital (scenario (a)) and, in all other scenarios,
can ensure higher levels of welfare than the dynamics without internalization of environmental
externalities.
In poor economies, inows of external investments are seen by policy makers as the main
solution to tackle scarcity of domestic capitals and to escape a poverty trap of low investments,
low growth and poverty perpetuation. The arrival of external investors is considered to be
benecial for economic expansion and diversication of the local economy.
Our results suggest that environmental preservation and protection should be considered as
a complementary rather than a supplementary measure to the openness to inows of external
investment in impacting sectors even in an economy where barriers to labor movement do
not represent an obstacle towards full specialization in the incoming activities which are not
dependent on environmental resources. Environmental defense, in the form of support to the
initial endowment of natural capital and to the environmental carrying capacity, and limitation
to pollution impact of external investment are prerequisites for a welfare improving coexistence
between the two sectors in the economy we have analyzed.
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